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Are international business cycles




By the year’s end, Europe will have taken the final
step in the most ambitious monetary experiment
of the postwar era by establishing a common
currency area (the European Monetary Union
[EMU]), an extreme form of fixed exchange rate
regime in which member countries use the same
currency. There is a widespread belief that coun-
tries tied to a fixed exchange rate regime are more
susceptible to foreign disturbances, particularly
monetary disturbances. In other words, there is
a belief that flexible exchange rates offer greater
insulation from foreign disturbances. A major
concern surrounding the EMU and fixed exchange
rate regimes, in general, is that business cycles
of member countries may become more volatile
under a common currency or fixed exchange
rate because they are not only subject to domes-
tic shocks but also have increased sensitivity to
foreign disturbances.
This conventional view of fixed versus flexi-
ble exchange rate regimes stems more from anec-
dotal evidence than statistical evidence. Two recent
events support this view. First is the experience
of the United Kingdom (UK) and its continental
counterparts in the 1990s. Member countries of
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM),
which stayed tied to the German mark (DM) af-
ter German reunification, were forced to tighten
monetary policy and suffered a severe and per-
sistent economic downturn that is only now
abating. The UK chose to leave the ERM in 1992
and devalue against the DM rather than raise
domestic interest rates to maintain its currency
peg with the DM. Unlike its continental counter-
parts, the UK experienced a strong recovery in
the early 1990s, which has carried through to the
present. Second, severe economic downturns in
Mexico in 1994 and Asia in 1997 came about be-
cause of massive capital outflows and banking
collapses that flowed from currency crises involving
a U.S. dollar exchange rate peg that was incon-
sistent with the market’s desired level. Looking
to the past, monetary historians like Eichengreen
(1992) frequently argue that countries that aban-
doned the gold exchange standard experienced
an economic downturn that was far less severe
than that of countries which stayed pegged to
the United States’ currency during the depres-
sion of the 1930s.
One empirical observation that seems to be
at odds with this view is the emergence of a
stronger international business cycle after the
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate regime
(which had been established by the Bretton Woods
agreement in July 1944) in the early 1970s. The
key stylized fact supporting this is the observed
higher correlations between national output
fluctuations of the U.S. and other G7 (Group of
Seven) countries in the flexible exchange rate
period from 1973 to the present, or the post-Bretton
Woods (PBW) period, relative to the Bretton
Woods (BW) fixed exchange rate period from
1949 to 1971. This evidence works against the
conventional view of fixed versus flexible regimes
because cross-country correlations of output
fluctuations rise if the importance of global or
foreign shocks rises. Moreover, it questions the
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insulation properties of flexible exchange rates
over fixed exchange rates. This evidence also
suggests that the behavior of international business
cycles may be intimately related to the exchange
rate regime.
This article offers an exploratory analysis of
the link between exchange rate regimes and the
behavior of international business cycles. I esti-
mate statistical models of the U.S. and its G7
counterparts over the postwar fixed and flexible
exchange rate periods. I use these empirical
models to get a better sense of the factors under-
lying the higher degree of business cycle comove-
ment between the U.S. and the other G7 nations
in the PBW period. There are essentially four
factors that would lead to higher correlations of
U.S. and G7 industrial production: 1) an increase
in the volatility of global disturbances (such as
oil prices); 2) an increase in the volatility of U.S.
disturbances that affect the rest of the G7 and
an increase in the volatility of G7 disturbances
that affect the U.S.; 3) increased sensitivity to
G7 disturbances for the U.S. and increased sen-
sitivity to U.S. disturbances for the rest of the
G7; and 4) a change in U.S. and G7 responses
to global or foreign disturbances, so that they
became more alike.
My empirical results suggest that higher
comovement emerged in PBW due to a combi-
nation of factors 2 and 4. First, the sensitivity to
U.S. monetary policy shocks for the rest of the
G7 remained unchanged over the fixed and flex-
ible exchange rate regimes, but the volatility of
shocks to U.S. monetary policy increased signifi-
cantly in the flexible exchange rate period. This
made U.S. monetary policy disturbances a more
important source of variation for G7 industrial
production and, in the process, raised the corre-
lation between U.S. and G7 output fluctuations.
Second, the responses of the G7 to all shocks,
global and domestic, changed in the flexible regime
so that they were more alike than in the fixed
exchange rate period. One of the important find-
ings of this study is that G7 sensitivity to foreign
and domestic monetary policy shocks remained
unchanged over the fixed and flexible exchange
rate periods. This result questions conventional
wisdom, which argues that flexible exchange
rates insulate countries against foreign monetary
shocks. It also suggests that the domestic impact
of monetary policy is invariant to the exchange
rate regime.
Overview of U.S.G7 exchange rate regimes
In July 1944, representatives from 44 countries
met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to draft
and sign the Articles of Agreement that established
the International Monetary Fund.1 The system
set up by the Bretton Woods agreement called
for fixed exchange rates against the U.S. dollar
and an unvarying dollar price of gold of $35 an
ounce. Member countries held their official inter-
national reserves in gold or dollar assets and had
the right to sell dollars to the Federal Reserve for
gold at the official price. The system was thus a
gold exchange standard, with the dollar as its
principal reserve currency.
The earliest sign that BW was near collapse
came in early 1968 when central bankers an-
nounced the creation of a two-tier gold market,
with one private tier and the other official. Private
traders traded freely on the London gold market
and the gold price set there was allowed to fluc-
tuate. In contrast, central banks would continue
to transact with others in the official tier at the
fixed price of $35 dollars an ounce. This came
about because of speculation of a rise in the official
gold conversion rate following the British pound’s
devaluation in November 1967. The gold exchange
standard was intended to prevent inflation by
tying down gold’s dollar price. By severing the
link between the supply of dollars and a fixed mar-
ket price of gold, central bankers had removed the
system’s built-in safeguard against inflation.
The U.S. experienced a widening current
account deficit in early 1971. This set off a mas-
sive private purchase of the DM, because most
traders expected a revaluation of the DM against
the dollar. By August 1971, the markets forced
the U.S. to devalue the dollar and suspend gold
convertibility with other central banks. Under
the Smithsonian agreement in December 1971,
the U.S. dollar was devalued roughly 8 percent
against all other currencies. An ever-widening
U.S. current account deficit led to further specu-
lative attacks against the dollar in February 1973.
By March, the U.S. dollar was floating against
the currencies of Europe and Japan. This marked
the official end of the fixed exchange period for
the U.S., although one could argue that the U.S.
abandoned fixed exchange rates in August 1971.
In my analysis, I treat August 1971 as the end of
the fixed exchange rate period and the period
following January 1974 as the flexible exchange
rate period, because all industrial countries had
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Over the last 100 years, the U.S. has partici-
pated in nine different exchange rate regimes
with other G7 countries.2 Many of these exchange
arrangements emerged because of the disruption
to currency markets caused by the two world
wars. Exchange rate regimes are generally char-
acterized as either fixed or floating. These labels
are misleading as they suggest that fixed or float-
ing regimes are perfectly homogeneous. In a fixed
exchange rate system, currencies are pegged to
some reserve currency. The pegged currency in
the case of BW was the U.S. dollar. Alternatively,
floating exchange rate regimes allow currencies
to move freely against all currencies. Historically,
exchange rate regimes have been somewhere in
between these extremes. Figure 1 shows how
the foreign currency/U.S. dollar rates of the UK,
Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and Canada var-
ied during the BW era. It is clear that the Cana-
dian dollar/U.S. dollar rate was allowed to vary
considerably over the period, while the other
currencies were allowed large discrete devalua-
tions/revaluations. Similarly, the regimes follow-
ing BW were not pure floating regimes. What is
immediately obvious from figure 1 is that exchange
rate movements at all frequencies have been
Fixed versus flexible foreign exchange rates
FIGURE 1
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considerably more volatile under the flexible
exchange rate regime.
Analyzing exchange rate regimes and
international business cycles
There is a wealth of empirical research doc-
umenting the properties of macroeconomic time
series from the postwar fixed and flexible exchange
rate eras. For example, Baxter and Stockman
(1989) investigate the differences in time-series
behavior of key economic variables during the
BW and PBW periods. Figure 2 shows selected
data from Baxter and Stockman. In contrast to
Baxter and Stockman, I find that the cross-country
correlations of cyclical movements in U.S. and
G7 industrial production are considerably higher
in the flexible exchange rate period (see upper
panel of figure 2).3,4 The obvious exception is
Canada. The correlation between Canadian and
U.S. industrial production is roughly constant
over the BW and PBW periods. Volatility statistics
reported in the lower panel of figure 2 are simi-
lar to Baxter and Stockman’s in suggesting that
industrial production was more volatile in G7
countries in the flexible exchange rate period.
Given the relatively small sample size for
the industrial output data, the correlations in
the PBW period may be driven by one or two
influential data points. I explore this issue in
figure 3 by plotting cyclical fluctuations in G7
industrial production series over the fixed and
flexible regimes. The low correlation between
the U.S. and other G7 country industrial pro-
duction (excluding Canada) is obvious in the
BW period, the period before the solid vertical
line. More importantly, the high correlation in
the PBW period seems to be linked to the 1973–75
period, which coincides with the first oil price
shock, and the 1979–83 period, which coincides
with the second oil price shock and the period
when the U.S. Federal Reserve experimented
with direct targeting of monetary aggregates.
My findings add to similar results in the liter-
ature using other empirical techniques, such as
frequency domain analysis. For example, Gerlach
(1988) and Bowden and Martin (1995) find that
the correlation between national output of the
U.S. and that of various European countries has
increased over so-called business cycle horizons
ranging from one and a half years to eight years.
Their analysis also suggests that the volatility of
national output rose in the flexible period.
As many researchers have noted, work like
that of Gerlach, Bowden and Martin, and Baxter
and Stockman leaves open the question of whether
the increased interdependence observed under
the flexible exchange rates is attributable to a change
in the response to underlying disturbances (which
may have flowed from the move to a flexible ex-
change rate regime) or the changing nature of
the underlying disturbances themselves. This
question has been the focus of two different quan-
titative literatures.
Theoretical research on international
business cycles
One branch has attempted to explain the in-
ternational business cycle through quantitative
theoretical models of international trade. So far
these models are “real” in the sense that there is
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International business cycles under fixed
and flexible exchange rate systems
Note: Industrial production data filtered using the monthly
business cycle band-pass filter described in Baxter and
King (1995).
Source: Authors calculations using data from the
International Monetary Fund.Economic Perspectives 50
no role for monetary disturbances. They completely
ignore monetary aspects of the international
business cycle by relying wholly on international
business cycle transmission through real routes
such as goods and asset trade. This literature was
recently surveyed by Baxter (1995) and Backus,
Kehoe, and Kydland (1995). They report that
models that allow for realistic trade in capital are
unable to generate international comovement.
In contrast, less realistic models that ignore trade
in capital goods, such as Stockman and Tesar
(1995), have been shown to generate international
comovement. Others (including Kouparitsas [1996])
have been successful at explaining positive out-
put correlations between developing and indus-
trial countries by allowing for trade in capital
and intermediate goods. Unfortunately, the
business cycle transmission mechanisms at work
in these industrial and developing country trade
models are absent in international trade between
industrial countries. This analysis suggests that
monetary or nominal factors may be an important
component in explaining international business























































Cyclical movements of U.S. and G7 industrial production
FIGURE 3
Note: Industrial production data filtered as in figure 2.
Source: Author's calculations using data from the International Monetary Fund.Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 51
Empirical research on international
business cycles
Others have approached the issue by studying
international business cycles within the context
of structural econometric models.5 For example,
Hutchinson and Walsh’s (1992) individual coun-
try analysis studies U.S.–Japanese business cycles
over the fixed and flexible regimes. In addition,
multicountry analyses, such as Ahmed et al.
(1993) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994),
study U.S.–aggregate G7 business cycles. A com-
mon finding among these studies is that the nature
of underlying disturbances changed over the
fixed and flexible periods. In particular, global
shocks became more volatile relative to national
shocks. There is some disagreement over whether
there was any change in the way the U.S. and
G7 responded to these underlying disturbances
when they shifted from fixed to floating rates.
Ahmed et al. (1993) argue that there was no change
in the response to shocks under the flexible regime.
Hutchinson and Walsh (1992) and Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1994) argue that there were changes
in the response to shocks in the flexible period.
Hutchinson and Walsh find that flexible exchange
rates afforded Japan some additional insulation
from foreign disturbances, while Bayoumi and
Eichengreen argue that the shift to flexible exchange
rates steepened the aggregate demand curve of
the G7, which tended to make prices more, and
output less, sensitive to supply shocks.
My analysis is essentially a multicountry
version of Hutchinson and Walsh (1992). I look
at the behavior of U.S.–G7 business cycles by
studying bivariate models for the six U.S.–G7
pairs. I adopt a slightly different structural model
of the U.S. and G7 by drawing on the approach
of Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), developed in
their work on the link between monetary policy
disturbances and exchange rate movements.
Despite this difference, my results suggest that
the findings from Hutchinson and Walsh’s (1992)
U.S.–Japan analysis extend to other G7 countries.
Methodology and data
One way of summarizing interactions among
a set of variables is through a vector autoregression
(VAR). A VAR is a statistical method that allows
one to estimate how an unpredictable disturbance
(or change) in one variable affects other variables
in the economy. For example, one of the questions
that is raised by theoretical research is whether a
change in foreign monetary policy has a weaker
effect on domestic industrial production under
flexible exchange rates. A VAR can be used to
answer this type of question, since it allows one
to estimate the way that an unpredicted change
in monetary policy affects domestic industrial
production under a fixed or flexible exchange
rate regime.
The choice of variables that one includes in
a VAR depends on the questions one wants
answered. There is a wide range of variables
one can use in analyzing U.S.–G7 business cycles.
I follow Hutchinson and Walsh (1992) by limiting
my analysis of U.S.–G7 business cycles to six VARs,
which essentially study interaction between the
U.S. and a foreign country of interest, in this case
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, or the UK.
Each VAR is designed to study how unpredicted
changes in world oil prices, U.S. and foreign in-
dustrial production, and U.S. monetary policy
(ratio of nonborrowed reserves to total reserves)
affect U.S. and foreign industrial production.6
One of the challenges facing researchers is
that data for the BW period typically date back to
1960, which leaves a small sample of just under
12 years. I use January 1974 as the start date of the
flexible period, because all of the G7 countries
had moved to a flexible exchange rate system by
then. PBW data run through to the present, so
the sample size is over 20 years. Following
Eichenbaum and Evans, I overcome these data
limitations by using monthly data and restricting
the VARs, so that they estimate relationships
between the four variables with data from the
previous six months. In other words, I estimate
the link between movements in industrial pro-
duction and oil price movements that occurred
within the last six months.7
With these models in hand, I am able to
address whether the higher degree of business
cycle comovement between the U.S. and the other
G7 nations in the PBW period is due to 1) an
increase in the volatility of global disturbances
(such as oil prices); 2) an increase in the volatility
of U.S. disturbances that affect the rest of the G7
and an increase in the volatility of G7 disturbances
that affect the U.S.; 3) increased sensitivity to G7
disturbances for the U.S. and increased sensitivity
to U.S. disturbances for the rest of the G7; or 4)
a change in U.S. and G7 responses to global or
foreign disturbances, so that they became more
alike. For instance, consider estimates of the VAR
over the fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of disturbances across the
two periods will be reflected
in changes in the ratio of the
standard deviations of un-
predicted movements in oil
prices, output, and monetary
policy across the two periods.
Differences in the way U.S.
and foreign industrial pro-
duction react to various dis-
turbances will be embodied
in the estimated parameters
of the VAR and revealed
through changes in the shape
and size of the model’s im-
pulse response function. For
a description of the method-
ology in greater detail, see
the technical appendix.
Empirical results
I break my empirical
analysis into three parts.
First, I determine the sources
of variation in industrial
production of the U.S. and
other G7 countries in the
BW and PBW periods. Sec-
ond, I highlight changes in
the underlying disturbances
by studying the variance of
disturbances. Finally, I ana-
lyze whether the response to
the disturbances changed
over the BW to PBW period
by comparing the shape of the
impulse response functions
from BW and PBW models.
Were foreign or global
disturbances more important
in the flexible exchange rate
period?
Table 1 reports decom-
positions of forecast errors
of industrial production for
various U.S.–G7 pairs. These
decompositions indicate the
share of the error attributable
to a particular disturbance
for a given forecast horizon.
The forecast error variance
decompositions suggest that






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































relative importance of the various
disturbances during the BW and
PBW periods at forecast horizons
of one to five years. The findings
appear to be uniform across the
six sets of bilateral pairs. From
the perspective of the other G7
countries, foreign disturbances
seem to play a larger role in the
flexible exchange rate period. In
particular, domestic industrial
production disturbances clearly
dominate shocks to oil prices,
U.S. industrial production, and
U.S. monetary policy in the fixed
exchange rate period, but are a
less important source of varia-
tion in the flexible exchange rate
period. A similar result emerges
for U.S. industrial production.
Disturbances to U.S. industrial
production are also a less impor-
tant source of variation to U.S.
industrial production in the
flexible exchange rate period.
The most striking result is the
increased importance of U.S.
monetary disturbances under
the flexible exchange rate regime.
Finally, in contrast to prior be-
liefs, the role of oil price distur-
bances is little changed across
the two regimes. Overall, these
results suggest that a greater
share of the fluctuations in G7
industrial production seem to
be driven by common sources
of disturbance in the flexible ex-
change rate period. These find-
ings are similar to those of
Hutchinson and Walsh’s (1992)
Japanese study.
Forecast error variance de-
compositions point to the sources
of variation in industrial output,
but they do not answer the question
of whether the changing character
of the relative variance of distur-
bances or of the response to these
disturbances is at the heart of the
increased comovement of national
outputs. To answer this question,























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the disturbances and the impulse
response functions of the models
estimated over the fixed and flex-
ible exchange rate periods.
Were global disturbances more
volatile in the flexible exchange
rate period?
Table 2 reports the ratio of
the standard deviations of the
various disturbances under the
fixed and flexible exchange rate
regimes. As expected, unexpected
changes to oil prices are roughly
ten times more volatile over the
flexible period. In contrast, unex-
pected changes to U.S., Canadian,
German, Italian, Japanese, and
UK industrial production display
roughly the same level of volatil-
ity across the periods, while un-
expected changes to industrial
production in France are consid-
erably lower in the flexible period.
Finally, unexpected changes to
U.S. monetary policy are rough-
ly twice as volatile in the flexible
exchange rate period. Based on
these findings, it is clear that for
G7 countries (excluding the U.S.),
foreign sources of disturbance
became relatively more volatile
in the flexible exchange rate peri-
od.8 The question that remains is
whether the G7’s response to
these disturbances changed with
the move from fixed to flexible
exchange rates.
Are responses to disturbances
different under fixed and flexible
exchange rate regimes?
Figures 4–7 compare the re-
sponses of the G7 countries over
the fixed and flexible exchange
rate periods to the four underly-
ing disturbances—changes in oil
prices, U.S. industrial production,
G7 industrial production, and
U.S. monetary policy. Note that
the models’ responses are stan-
dardized so that each figure plots
the response to a 1 percent increase




Oil U.S. industrial Canadian industrial U.S. monetary
Period prices production production policy
Fixed 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.7
Flexible 11.2 0.7 1.2 1.3
Ratio 11.0 1.0 1.3 1.8
France–U.S. model
Structural disturbance
Oil U.S. industrial French industrial U.S. monetary
Period prices production production policy
Fixed 1.0 0.7 3.8 0.7
Flexible 11.2 0.7 1.3 1.3
Ratio 10.9 1.0 0.3 1.8
Germany–U.S. model
Structural disturbance
Oil U.S. industrial German industrial U.S. monetary
Period prices production production policy
Fixed 1.0 0.7 1.7 0.7
Flexible 11.2 0.7 1.5 1.3
Ratio 11.1 1.0 0.9 1.8
Italy–U.S. model
Structural disturbance
Oil U.S. industrial Italian industrial U.S. monetary
Period prices production production policy
Fixed 1.0 0.7 2.3 0.7
Flexible 11.3 0.7 2.3 1.3
Ratio 10.9 1.1 1.0 1.8
Japan–U.S. model
Structural disturbance
Oil U.S. industrial Japanese industrial U.S. monetary
Period prices production production policy
Fixed 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.7
Flexible 11.3 0.7 1.1 1.3
Ratio 11.2 1.0 1.2 1.8
UK–U.S. model
Structural disturbance
Oil U.S. industrial UK industrial U.S. monetary
Period prices production production policy
Fixed 1.0 0.7 1.1 0.7
Flexible 11.0 0.7 1.4 1.3
Ratio 10.7 1.0 1.2 1.8
Notes: The first (second) row in each block refers to the standard deviation of
the structural disturbance in the fixed (flexible) exchange rate model. The third
row is the ratio of the standard deviation of the structural disturbance in the flexible
to fixed period (values exceeding 1 indicate an increase in the variance of
the structural disturbance).
Source: Calculations from authors statistical model, using the following monthly
data series: International Monetary Fund, world crude oil prices and G7 industrial
production; and Federal Reserve Board of Governors, nonborrowed reserves
and total reserves.
Estimated percentage standard deviations of
structural disturbances
me to compare the shape and size of
the response under fixed or flexible
exchange rates.
Oil price disturbances
Figure 4 plots responses to oil
price changes in the fixed and flexi-
ble periods. Note the scale for the
response function for the flexible
period is one-tenth that of the fixed
period response. It is obvious that a
1 percent shock to oil prices had a
smaller impact on U.S. and G7 in-
dustrial production in the flexible
period in both the short and long
run. The response functions for oil
price changes also have quite differ-
ent shapes over the two periods. The
impact effect of oil prices varies
across G7 countries for the fixed ex-
change rate period, while the long-run
effect is consistently positive. In con-
trast, during the flexible exchange rate
period, the impact effect of oil prices
is positive, while the long-run effect
is negative for all G7 countries. The
previous section suggests that oil
price movements were generally no
more significant a source of variation
in the flexible period. Figure 4 sug-
gests that oil price changes were a
source of the increased comovement,
because G7 countries started respond-
ing in a similar way to these common
shocks in the flexible period.
U.S. industrial production
A similar result emerges for
shocks to U.S. industrial production
(see figure 5). In the fixed exchange
rate period, shocks to U.S. produc-
tion generally had a negative imme-
diate impact on other G7 countries,
which changed to a positive long-
run effect. In the flexible period, the
other G7 countries’ response to U.S.
industrial production shocks
changed to a hump-shaped pattern.
This pattern is similar to the re-
sponse function of U.S. industrial
production in both the fixed and flex-
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Effect on Italian industrial production
number of quarters after shock
percent
U.S.-Canada model U.S.-Japan model
U.S.-Germany model U.S.-UK model
U.S.-France model U.S.-Italy model
9 1 82 73 64 5
Impulse response functions: Shock to world oil prices
FIGURE 4
Notes: All figures report percentage changes in U.S. and other G7 industrial production following a 1 percent shock to the world price of oil in the fixed or flexible exchange rate period.
The solid color (black) lines represent the point estimate for the fixed (flexible) exchange rate period. The color shaded areas (dashed lines) are the 95 percent confidence bands, computed
by Monte Carlo simulation using 1,000 independent draws for the fixed (flexible) exchange rate model.
Source: Calculations from authors statistical model, using the following monthly data series: International Monetary Fund, world crude oil prices and G7 industrial production;
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Impulse response functions: Shock to U.S. industrial production
FIGURE 5
Notes: All figures report percentage changes in U.S. and other G7 industrial production following a 1 percent shock to U.S. industrial production in the fixed or flexible exchange rate period.
The solid color (black) lines represent the point estimate for the fixed (flexible) exchange rate period. The color shaded areas (dashed lines) are the 95 percent confidence bands, computed by
Monte Carlo simulation using 1,000 independent draws for the fixed (flexible) exchange rate model.
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FIGURE 6
Notes: All figures report percentage changes in U.S. and other G7 industrial production following a 1 percent shock to foreign industrial production in the fixed or flexible exchange rate period.
The solid color (black) lines represent the point estimate for the fixed (flexible) exchange rate period. The color shaded areas (dashed lines) are the 95 percent confidence bands, computed by
Monte Carlo simulation using 1,000 independent draws for the fixed (flexible) exchange rate model.
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FIGURE 7
Notes: All figures report percentage changes in U.S. and other G7 industrial production following a 1 percent shock to U.S. monetary policy in the fixed or flexible exchange rate period.
The solid color (black) lines represent the point estimate for the fixed (flexible) exchange rate period. The color shaded areas (dashed lines) are the 95 percent confidence bands, computed
by Monte Carlo simulation using 1,000 independent draws for the fixed (flexible) exchange rate model.
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transmission of U.S. production shocks changed
significantly in the latter period. One clear ex-
ception to this is Canada, which had roughly the
same hump-shaped response to U.S. industrial
production shocks in the two estimation peri-
ods. Just as in the case of oil prices, the common
responses to U.S. industrial production shocks
in the flexible exchange rate period are also a
source of the increased comovement of U.S.–G7
industrial production.
Foreign industrial production
In contrast to the earlier results, figure 6 sug-
gests that U.S. industrial production’s response to
foreign industrial production shocks is largely un-
changed over the two periods. Except for Canada,
foreign industrial production innovations have
an insignificant impact on U.S. industrial produc-
tion in the short and long run in both the fixed and
flexible periods. In the case of shocks to Canada’s
industrial production, the U.S. and Canada share
similar shaped response functions under the two
regimes, so this is a possible source of comovement
for the U.S. and Canada.
U.S. monetary policy
Finally, I look at unexpected changes in U.S.
monetary policy. The monetary indicator used
here is the ratio of nonborrowed reserves to to-
tal reserves. An exogenous increase in the ratio
would indicate a tightening of monetary policy.
Figure 7 shows that, historically, shocks to U.S.
monetary policy (higher ratios of nonborrowed
to total reserves) are associated with a contraction
in U.S. and G7 industrial production. Textbook
open economy macroeconomic models suggest
that a standardized foreign monetary policy
shock will have a smaller impact on countries
that maintain flexible exchange rates. That also
appears to be the consensus view from anecdotal
evidence on the abandonment of the gold exchange
standard and the UK’s recent exit from the ERM.
Figure 7 reveals that G7 countries responded to
U.S. monetary disturbances is a similar way in the
BW and PBW periods. In particular, the impulse
response functions of these countries to U.S.
monetary disturbances display the same shape,
with a significant negative long-run effect. These
results suggest that for other G7 countries, flexible
exchange rates offer no greater insulation against
foreign monetary disturbances. This result is clearly
at odds with the consensus viewpoint.
Recall the finding from the previous section
that U.S. monetary disturbances became more
volatile in the flexible period. Combining this
with the fact that the response to these shocks is
common, we can see why U.S. monetary policy
disturbances became a greater source of varia-
tion in G7 industrial production.
Summary
These experiments suggest that the correlation
of U.S. and G7 output fluctuations rose in the flex-
ible exchange rate period because of two factors.
First, the G7’s response to various structural distur-
bances became more alike in the flexible exchange
rate period. Second, global or foreign shocks, such
as U.S. monetary policy, became more volatile in
the flexible exchange rate period.
Conclusion
This article sheds light on the link between
exchange rate regimes and international business
cycles. The key stylized fact is that the correla-
tion of cyclical fluctuations in industrial output
of the U.S. and other G7 countries rose quite
dramatically in the flexible exchange rate period.
This calls into question conventional wisdom,
which argues that flexible exchange rates increase
the degree to which national economies are insu-
lated from the effects of foreign/global disturbances.
By estimating a series of bilateral models of the
U.S. and its G7 counterparts over the postwar
fixed and flexible exchange rate periods, I was
able to determine that higher comovement
emerged in the PBW period due to a combina-
tion of two factors. First, the sensitivity to U.S.
monetary policy shocks among the rest of the
G7 countries remained unchanged over the
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes, but the
volatility of shocks to U.S. monetary policy in-
creased significantly in the flexible exchange rate
period. This made U.S. monetary policy distur-
bances a more important source of variation for
G7 industrial production and, in the process,
raised the correlation of U.S. and G7 output fluc-
tuations. Second, the responses of the G7 to all
shocks, global and domestic, changed in the flex-
ible regime so that they were more alike than in
the fixed exchange rate period. One of the impor-
tant findings of this study is that G7 sensitivity
to foreign and domestic monetary policy shocks
remained unchanged in the flexible exchange
rate period.
There is much debate in the popular press
and academic circles about the desirability of
pursuing a common currency area in Europe.Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 61
This appendix describes my methodology in
greater technical detail. To isolate the various
exogenous shocks, including U.S. monetary pol-
icy shocks, I use the vector autoregression
(VAR) procedure developed by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994a, 1994b). Let Zt
denote the 4 ´ 1 vector of all variables in the
model at date t. This vector includes changes in
the log of world oil prices (POIL), log levels of
U.S. industrial production (USIP), log levels of
industrial production for another G7 country
(FORIP), and the ratio of U.S. nonborrowed to
total reserves (NBR), which I assume is the U.S.
monetary policy indicator. The order of the
variables is:
1) Zt  =  (POILt, USIPt, FORIPt, NBRt).
I assume that Zt follows a sixth-order VAR:
2) Zt  =  A0  +  A1Zt – 1  +  A2Zt – 2  + ...
+  AqZt–6 + ut,
where Ai, i = 0,1, ... , 6 are 4 ´ 4 coefficient matri-
ces, and the 4 ´ 1 disturbance vector ut is
serially uncorrelated. I assume that the funda-
mental exogenous process that drives the econ-
omy is a 4 ´ 1 vector process {et} of serially
uncorrelated shocks, with a covariance matrix
equal to the identity matrix. The VAR distur-
bance vector ut is a linear function of a vector et
of underlying economic shocks, as follows:
uC tt =e ,
where the 4 ´ 4 matrix C is the unique lower-
triangular decomposition of the covariance
matrix of ut:
CC E u u tt '[ ] =¢  .
This structure implies that the jth element of
ut is correlated with the first j elements of et, but
is orthogonal to the remaining elements of et.
Following Christiano et al., I assume that in
setting policy, the U.S. Federal Reserve both re-
acts to the economy and affects the economy; I
use the VAR structure to capture these cross-di-
rectional relationships. In particular, I assume
the feedback rule can be written as a linear func-
tion Y defined over a vector Wt of variables ob-
served at or before date t. That is, if I let NBRt
denote the ratio of U.S. nonborrowed to total re-
serves, then U.S. monetary policy is completely
described by:
3) NBR c t t t = + Y W ( ) , , 4 4 4 e
where e4t is the fourth element of the funda-
mental shock vector et, and c4,4 is the (4,4)th ele-
ment of the matrix C.  (Recall that NBRt is the
fourth element of Zt.)  In equation 3, Y (Wt) is
the feedback-rule component of U.S. monetary
policy, and c4,4 e4t is the exogenous U.S. mone-
tary policy shock. Since e4t  has unit variance,
c4,4 is the standard deviation of this policy
shock. Following Christiano et al., I model Wt as
containing lagged values (dated t – 1 and earli-
er) of all variables in the model, as well as time t
values of those variables the monetary authority
looks at contemporaneously in setting policy.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
The debate is an old one. Early examples include
work by Mundell (1961), who argued that the
desirability of a common currency area depends
on the nature of disturbances and the economies’
response to these shocks. Highly correlated dis-
turbances and similar responses to disturbances
were argued by Mundell to be essential elements
in the desirability of a common currency area.
Here, I use empirical techniques that uncover
the nature of disturbances and the responses to
these shocks with a view to understanding why
fluctuations in national outputs of countries are
highly correlated. My results suggest that G7 coun-
tries respond to shocks in a similar way and that
common global shocks explain a large share of the
variance of national output fluctuations. In the
light of these empirical findings and Mundell’s
theoretical results, it would seem that the G7
would gain from the move to a common currency.Economic Perspectives 62
In accordance with the assumptions of the feed-
back rule, an exogenous shock e4t to monetary
policy cannot contemporaneously affect time t
values of the elements of Wt. However, lagged
values of e4t can affect the variables in Wt.
I incorporate equation 3 into the VAR struc-
ture of equations 1 and 2. Variables POIL, USIP,
and FORIP are the contemporaneous inputs to
the monetary feedback rule. These are the only
components of Wt that are not determined prior
to date t. With this structure, we can identify the
right-hand side of equation 3 with the fourth
equation in VAR equation 1: Y (Wt) equals the
fourth row of A0 + A1Zt–1 + A2Zt–2 + ... + A6 Zt–6,
plus  ii i t c = å 1
3
4 e   (where c4i denotes the (4,i)th ele-
ment of matrix C, and eit denotes the ith element
of et ).  Note that NBRt is correlated with the first
four elements of et. By construction, the shock c4,4
e4t to U.S. monetary policy is uncorrelated with
the monetary policy feedback rule  Wt.
I estimate matrices Ai, i = 0,1, ... , 6 and C by
ordinary least squares. The response of any vari-
able in Zt to an impulse in any element of the
fundamental shock vector et can then be comput-
ed by using equations 1 and 2.
The standard error bounds in figures 4
through 7 are computed by taking 1,000 random
draws from the asymptotic distribution of A0, A1,
... , A6, C, and, for each draw, computing the sta-
tistic whose standard error is desired. The report-
ed standard error bounds give the 95 percent
confidence bands from 1,000 random draws.
1This section draws heavily on material in Krugman and
Obstfeld (1994), chapter 19.
2Researchers such as Grilli and Kaminsky (1991) argue that dur-
ing this period the U.S. was involved in four fixed exchange
rate regimes, the gold standard from January 1879 to June 1914,
the gold exchange standard from May 1925 to August 1931, the
wartime control period from September 1939 to September
1949, and finally the Bretton Woods system from October 1949
to August 1971. With the exception of the wartime control peri-
od, these regimes involved a fixed rate of exchange between the
U.S. and other currencies in addition to a fixed dollar price of
gold. The intervening years and the period following abandon-
ment of the Bretton Woods system have been characterized by
various floating exchange rate regimes.
3In general time series, data are nonstationary. Nonstationary
data do not have well-defined standard deviations or correla-
tions. One way of overcoming this problem is to filter the data
using a filter that removes nonstationary components and ren-
ders the data stationary. Baxter and Stockman report statistics
for two different filters, a linear time trend and first difference
filter. In subsequent work, Baxter (1991) argued that these fil-
tered data highlight  frequencies of the data that are uninterest-
ing for policy analysis. Baxter and King (1995) responded to
this by developing a filter that is designed to isolate compo-
nents of the data corresponding to frequencies policy analysts
are interested in, the so-called business cycle frequencies of one
and a half to eight years. I use a Baxter–King business cycle fil-
ter to isolate cyclical movements in industrial production. How-
ever, filtering industrial production with a linear time trend or
first difference filter yields the same conclusion. This suggests
that Baxter and Stockman’s (1989) figure 4 is mislabeled.
4Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1995) study the cyclical proper-
ties of a broader set of national output data, for a smaller set of
countries (Canada, Japan, the UK, and the U.S.), over the fixed
and flexible periods. Using a similar business cycle filter, devel-
oped by Hodrick and Prescott (1997), they also find that the
volatility of gross domestic product (GDP) and the correlation
between foreign and U.S. GDP rose in the flexible period.
5Other empirical attempts have relied on cross-sectional econo-
metric methods. For example, Canova and Dellas (1993) study
the relationship between trade interdependence and business
cycle comovement. They argue that  comovement in the PBW
period seems to be due to common shocks rather than changes
in the international transmission of business cycles.
6Adding an indicator of foreign monetary policy had no im-
pact on the analysis.
7Before I can shed light on the issue of whether increased co-
movement in national output occurred because of changes in
the relative volatility of global versus national disturbances
and/or changes in the response to national and global distur-
bances, I need to impose some structure on the system of equa-
tions described by the VAR. There are numerous forms of
indentifying restrictions in the literature. In their work on Ja-
pan, Hutchinson and Walsh (1992) impose long-run restrictions
on the data. Identification in Ahmed et al. (1993) and Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1994) comes from different theoretical mod-
els. I use a recursive structure popularized by Sims (1972). This
approach imposes restrictions on the covariance function of the
disturbances of the model. In particular, structural disturbanc-
es are identified by imposing a recursive information ordering.
Throughout the analysis, I impose the following information
ordering: world oil prices; U.S. industrial production; foreign
industrial production; and indicator of U.S. monetary policy.
This approach assumes, as in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995),
that the U.S. monetary authority chooses the value of the mone-
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tary instrument after observing contemporaneous movements
in oil prices and U.S. and foreign industrial production. In this
setting I can conveniently refer to the structural disturbances as
an oil price or global shock, U.S. output shock, foreign output
shocks, and U.S. monetary policy shock.
8Ahmed et al. (1993), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), and
Hutchinson and Walsh (1992) also find that foreign or global
shocks became relatively more volatile in the flexible exchange
rate regime. This is a noteworthy result because each study
uses a different structural identification, but essentially ends
up with the same general conclusion about the changing
source of disturbances in the international economy.
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